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BOOK REVIEWS.
THE

RULE AGAINST

PERPETUITIES.

By

JOHN

C.

GRAY.

Second Edition. Boston, 19o6.
In looking over the second edition of Professor Gray's
valuable, or rather invaluable, work on the rule against
perpetuities, the first and obvious thought is that it is not
possible in the second edition of any scientific work to do
much more than supplement the original edition with such
additional light as has been shed upon the problems involved
since the date of the first edition. No reader of Mr. Gray's
work needs to be reminded of the fact that it created an
epoch in the study of the subject; what had before his time
been treated as a more or less mysterious principle of more
or less difficult application, was placed by him upon a simple
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and scientific basis, so that he could argue with t good deal
of force that the application of his principle was susceptible
of almost mathematical accuracy. It was this underlying
thought in his work that distinguished it from any of the
other"essays upon the same subject. Inasmuch as many of
the courts had not proceeded upon the principle as he expounded it, it is certainly a matter of interest to inquire
how far his views have been effective in bringing about the
establishment of the principles for which. he contended.
Looking at his second edition from this point of view, we
find that it is conveniently arranged under the same section
numbers, the new matter in the body of the book being
grouped under sub-sections. For example, to section 214,
which is identical with section 214 in the first edition, there
are added five new sections, numbered from 214a to 214e
inclusive, in which the original doctrine of 214 is amplified,
and some recent cases upon the point are cited and discussed.
Incidentally it may be remarked that substantially the whole
of the original text has been used in its original form; the
only omission that has been noted is that the original section
122 has been omitted altogether. It may be also worth noting that Mr. Gray has apparently not yet abandoned his
investigation among the old cases. For example, sections
141 a to 141 f inclusive of the new edition are devoted to a
discussion of the cases in the sixteenth century which throw
additional light on the meaning of the word "perpetuities"
to the older judges.
Among the more interesting insertions in the second
edition are the following:
First, sections 214a to 214e inclusive, in which recent
cases in Massachusetts and Connecticut are cited as bearing
upon Gray's proposition that the contingency nust happen,
if at all, within the required limits. Applying his own proposition to these cases, he arrives at the conclusion that the
Massachusetts case was accurately decided, but suggests a
very strong query as to the Connecticut decision.
Secondly, in sections 245 c to 245 e inclusive, he summarizes
the principal Maryland decisions in which, as in Massachusetts and some other states, life estates and equitable fees
had been, as he maintains, inaccurately held to violate the
rule. After pointing out the apparent violation, and his
own hope that the court will see the error, as other courts
quoted by him had done, he adds in section 245 e that his
hope has been realized by a recent decision (19o4) in which,

as he thinks, the prior decisions have been tacitly overruled.
Apparently, Mr. Gray has not yet ceased to study with
interest the Pennsylvania decisions. Those familiar with his
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book will not easily forget the strong language in which some
of them, as for instance, Smith's Appeal. 88 Pa., bad been
criticized by him. In section 249 b of his second edition he
takes another fling at the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
and criticises the ruling in Johnston's Estate, i85 Pa. 179.
One may recognize frankly that in many branches of the
law text-book criticisms are entitled to comparatively little
weight. They are often made by unpractical and theoretical writers who do not feel the influence of the practical
considerations which properly affect the minds of judges.
In such a branch of the law, however, as that covered by
the rule against perpetuities, the contrary is the case. With
due respect, it is believed that the decision referred to was
made, not because the court disagreed with Mr. Gray's contention, but because the contention was not called to their
attention. In other words, it may perhaps be properly said
that in modern times the lawyer's education is not directed
largely to questions that are considered as antiquated as the
rule against perpetuities. Hence it follows that when in
practice a case involving this rule comes before the court
it is treated, not as one involving an important principle with
which the courts are familiar, and in which they are interested,
but as one to be disposed of with as little ceremony as may
be, upon the basis of any prior decisions which apparently
apply to it, without much reference to the desirability of
following any single underlying principle. Recent decisions
seem to indicate that this disposition is still evident in the
decisions of the courts in spite of the effort which Mr. Gray
has made to clear up the subject.
Thirdly, Mr. Gray was apparently more interested in exploding the old theory about "a possibility upon a possibility"
than any of the other mistakes which he found in the law on
the subject. Hence, it must have been a severe disappointment to him when in Whitby v. Mitchell and In re Frost, the
Court of Appeals in England upheld the older, and as he
claimed unsound, rule. He must have felt as disappointed
as when the courts of many states upheld spendthrifts' trusts
after in his work on "Restraints on Alienation" he had so
confidently denounced them. It looks, however, as if he may
be entitled to better luck this time, as in the addenda on
page 46 of the introduction he points out that in the recent
case of In re Ashforth (19o5), the court dissented from the
dictum of Judge Kay In re Frost in favor of the "possibility
upon a possibility." Certainly Mr. Gray has not been swerved
from his original opinion either by the recent English decisions or the criticisms on the same which he discusses fully
in his text.
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Fourthly, that Mr. Gray, however, is not unwilling to be
convinced, is shown by section 603 a of the second edition
in which he frankly admits some doubt as to the principles
laid down by him in the first edition with regard to the application of the rule to "charitable trusts."
As intimated at the outset, it would not be reasonable to
look in the second edition for a repetition of the new and
startling ideas contained in the first edition. Mr. Gray has,
however, still been thinking on the questions involved, with
the result that in the appendix to the second edition, under
the letters from e to i inclusive, he has added what are in
effect five new essays on the subject. These contain some
new and very interesting ideas which compare favorably with
the unusual ideas of which his first edition is so full. For
instance, in section e of the appendix he discusses at length
the recent criticisms on his opinion, as expressed in his second
chapter, as to the effect of the statute of "Quia Emptores"
on the possibility of creating determinable fees. He does not
retract his original opinion, but in section e furnishes some
additional reasons in support thereof. In this connection
he cannot fail to grasp the opportunity of discussing a line
of cases, of which Doe v. Eyre is the most conspicuous illustration, as to the effect upon the prior devise of the failure
for any reason of an executory gift. This line of cases seems
to the writer to present one of the most interesting questions
of the principles of the law of executory devises that still
remain partly unsettled by the courts. Mr. Gray, after
criticising with much force the English decisions upon the
point, finds in them some additional support for his theory
as to the effect of the statute of Quia Emptores.
Similarly in section f of the appendix he discusses more
fully the law of future interests in personal property,--apparently on the theory that it is easier to discuss it in this
form than to modify and rewrite the original text upon the
subject.
Upon the whole book it may properly be said that, if it is
not as startling as the first edition, nevertheless it presents
additional evidence of the author's resolve to inspire new life
into his subject. It may be honestly doubted whether in
these modem days any book on the subject of real property
is likely to be written in which an apparently old subject
will be given new life and new interest and new practical
value in the way in which Professor Gray has in his work
"reviewed" the rule against perpetuities. In its way, it is
not only a classic of the law, but the classic of the modem
B.
R.
law on the subject of real property.
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THE LAW OF PASSENGER AND FREIGHT ELEVATORS. Second
and Revised Edition. By J. A. WEBB. The F. H. Thomas

Law Book Co. St. Louis. 19o5.
The second edition of the above work by Mr. J. A. Webb,
a very familiar author to most law students of the present
day, will no doubt be received very favorably by the profession at large. Obviously it will be a great aid in crystallizing a very unsettled branch of a most important division of
American law.
The law of Carriers is itself a comparatively novel thing,
and newest among these customs and regulations governing the great transportation of the day, are the peculiar
uses which attach to the vertical raising and lowering of
passengers and freight.
The elevator, or "lift" as it is commonly called in London,
is a product, in the sense of being universally used, of very
recent years, but its adaptability to our modern life and
methods of production is so apparent that in a short time it
has become a regular appointment, not only in all large business places but likewise in public places of abode, as hotels
and apartment houses.
One need only peruse, however, the daily newspaper to
notice the large number of accidents growing out of the use
of elevators to appreciate how perilous it is to human life.
It is therefore but natural that as .a branch of the law of
Carriers it has expanded very rapidly until it fills a large part
of present-day litigation. Yet because of its being so new
the law has no doubt drawn largely from analogies to the
uses and practices among other carriers, which necessarily
makes it more or leis unstable.
In this excellent work the author has treated the subject
with considerable minuteness. He begins with a definition
of the various kinds of elevators with special reference to the
degree of care required in their operation.
The second chapter deals with the construction and the
reciprocal rights and duties of the various persons concerned,
including the contractor, employees of both builder and owner,
firemen, police and even trespassers; together with the regulations for the use of proper appliances and fixtures to render
its erection and operation safe and yet practicable.
The third chapter is upon the operation of the elevator,
first with reference principally to the duties of the persons
directly connected with its manipulation, and second, with
respect to rights growing out of injuries to passengers and
*employees.
Then a chapter is devoted to injuries to outsiders as it
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were, as licensees and trespassers, while the last two chapters
are confined to "Pleadings and Practice" and "Damages"
respectively.
Thus a treatise by a man of Mr. Webb's standing upon
this somewhat unsettled subject has satisfied, to some extent at least, a much-felt want in reconciling the actual
decisions upon this branch of the law with other well-known
general principles of law. And as the cases have increased
so rapidly this new edition with such revisions as were found
necessary will be a great aid to students and practitioners.
G.- F. B.
A PRACTICAL HANDBOOK
PENNSYLVANIA BUSINESS LAW.
FOR BUSINESS MEN AND LAWYERS. By JOHN J. SULLIVAN,
A.M.,LL.B. The Accountancy Publishing Co. New York.
The profession seldom finds reason to praise legal treatises
intended "for business men and lawyers," but in the case
of Mr. Sullivan's book on Pennsylvania Business Law the
most jealous and exacting practitioner will find little to criticise. The titles discussed are such as every business man
meets in everyday transactions, and upon which it is necessary that he should have a certain degree of reliable information. Mr. Sullivan's style is always clear and lucid. He
avoids as far as possible the use of technical expressions,
but never sacrifices strict accuracy of statement to plainer
diction which might bear ambiguous interpretations. The
volume is divided into five books. The first covers the subject of Contracts in its various phases-Formation, Operation, Interpretation and Discharge. The second book includes the titles Agency, Partnership and Corporations, with
special reference to Pennsylvania statutory forms of partnership and associations. Book Third contains a discussion of
Bailments and Sales of Personal Property, and Leases and
Sales of Real Property. Book Fourth treats briefly the
Pennsylvania law of Suretyship, Guaranty and Insurance;
and Book Fifth reviews the principal elements of the law
relating to decedents' estates. The whole is carefully indexed.

J.A.K.

